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Sammendrag 
I Norge selges det flere elbiler per innbygger enn noe annet land i verden. En av årsakene er de gode 
vilkårene forbundet med kjøp og bruk av elbiler, kombinert med høye skattesatser på kjøp av 
konvensjonelle biler og drivstoff. Denne studien kvantifiserer samfunnsøkonomiske gevinster 
forbundet med å delvis fjerne de gunstige skatterabattene forbundet med kjøp av elbiler, og finner at 
en økning i dagens Norske skatt på å kjøpe/ eie en elbil fra 8 prosent til 37 prosent gir en 
velferdsgevinst på omlag 5500-6500 Norske kroner per tonn økning i utslippet av karbondioksid 
gasser på lang sikt. Anslaget forutsetter at elbiler drives av elektrisitet som ikke gir utslipp av 
klimagasser. Velferdsgevinsten blir betytlig høyere hvis det forutsettes at produksjon av elektrisitet 
fører til utslipp av klimagasser. Anslaget inkluderer ikke eventuelle gevinster forbundet med 
forbedringer i miljøet. Anslag på gevinsten av å redusere utslippet av klimagasser med et tonn variere 
fra 34 til 780 NOK ifølge US Environmental Protection Agency. Den gunstige beskatningen av elbiler 
i Norge er derfor et svært kostbart tiltak for å få ned utslippet av klimagasser. Reformen innebærer 
også at skatteinntektene til staten øker med over 40 mrd per år på lang sikt i faste 2005-priser. Årsaken 
er at husholdningene i større grad velger høyt beskattede bensin og diesel biler fremfor lavt beskattede 
elbiler. Velferdsgevinstene forbundet med å øke skatten på kjøp av elbiler til 84 prosent, som var 
gjennomsnittlig skattesats på kjøp av diesel biler i 2007, utgjør omlag 4500-4800 kroner per tonn 
økning i utslippet av karbondioksid gasser på lang sikt. Analysen fokus er på de langsiktige effektene 
av endringer i beskatning av elbiler. Studien ekskluderer momenter som er relevant for elbilens rolle i 
dagens samfunn. I analysen antas det blant annet at eksisterende gunstige ordninger forbundet med 
bruk av elbiler, som kjøring i kollektivfeltet, gratis parkering og lading, samt fritak fra å betale 
bompenger, fases ut. Studien forsøker ikke å belyse de kortsiktige effektene av endret beskatning av 
elbiler.  
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1. Introduction 
Governments in several countries have introduced tax exemptions for purchase of electric cars, see the 
European Automobile Manufacturers' Association (2010). Such tax exemptions contribute to lower 
green house gas (GHG) emissions by distorting consumers’ choice between electric and conventional 
cars. This study shed light on this trade off by quantifying the welfare impact of such distortions, and 
by comparing this welfare impact with estimates of the social cost of carbon.  
 
The literature on optimal environmental taxation show that taxes should be levied on goods that 
generate external damage, see Sandmo (1975), and several studies argue that tax rates should be set 
equal to the social marginal damage, see Bovenberg (1999) and Jacobs and de Mooij (2011). Hence, 
tax rates equivalent to externalities connected to greenhouse gas emissions and other local external 
effects connected to consumption of petrol and diesel, see Parry (2007b), is optimal according to this 
literature. General climate policy measures are however expected to have a modest impact on the 
transition towards more climate friendly cars, see Devogelaer and Gusbin (2010). Several countries 
have however choosen to implement tax exemptions for electric cars to boost the transition towards 
electric cars. Two studies find that this transition towards electric and plug-in hybrid cars leads to 
substantial reductions in GHG emissions, and that abatement costs are competitive. Pasaoglu et al. 
(2012) show that biofuel blends, hybrid cars, electric cars and fuel cell vehicles can decrease future 
well to wheel GHG emissions within the EU by 35 to 57 percent. The cost increase for vehicle owners 
can become acceptable as technological advances through learning reduces costs. Thiel et al. (2010) 
show that electrification of the vehicle fleet offer significant possibilities to reduce GHG emissions 
when adequate policies decarbonise the electricity generation1. The initial cost is substantial, but can 
decrease in later periods to very competitive CO2 abatement costs. These abatement costs are 
calculated by comparing the cost of electricity powered cars with the cost of conventional cars. This 
method, however, ignore welfare costs attached to preferences for attributes like maximum range and 
charging/ refueling time, which differ between electric and convensional cars. Substantial Norwegian 
tax exemptions and benefits for electric cars, combined with a modest market share for electric cars, 
suggest that such differences are important to consumers. The method also neglects to consider how 
tax exemptions and other policy insentives influence the welfare costs associated with distortions in 
consumers’ choice between electric and conventional cars. Ignoring welfare costs directly linked with 
such policy instruments limits these studies from conducting convincing analysis of welfare impacts of 
tax exemptions and other policy incentives for electric cars.  
                                                     
1 Hawkins et al. (2012) and Econ (2008) also show that a decarbonisation of the electricity generation is required to acheive 
emission reductions.  
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The present study contributes to the literature by quantifying the welfare gain per ton increase in GHG 
emissions of reducing the current favourable tax exemptions levied on electric cars in Norway. The 
analyses consider several aspects likely to influence the welfare gain of reducing these exemptions. 
Tax exemptions on electric cars are in many cases levied on purchase of the car, see the European 
Automobile Manufacturers' Association (2010), and by taxing consumption of electricity more 
leniently than consumption of petrol and diesel, see Eurostat (2007). Both these tax wedges are likely 
to distort consumers’ choice between electric and conventional cars as individuals take account of the 
tax on fuels when they buy a car, see Heldal et al. (2009). The present study considers both of these 
tax exemptions. Electric cars are also likely to become closer substitutes to petrol and diesel powered 
cars in the future. Taxing close substitutes with different rates is likely to generate substantial welfare 
costs according to Hatta and Haltiwanger (1986). Such taxation creates considerable distortions as 
consumers substitute towards the low tax good. This substitution effect also contributes to reduce tax 
revenue generated as the tax base of the high tax good is reduced. The present study analyses how 
these features affect the welfare gain of reducing tax exemptions levied on electric cars in Norway. A 
tax increase on purchase of electric cars is implemented into a model framework where cars which run 
on different types of fuels are treated as strong substitutes, see Bjertnæs et al. (2011). The Norwegian 
case is interesting because Norway is the only country in the world with a sizable stock of electric cars 
relative to the population even though the market share for electric cars is modest2. Heavy taxation of 
petrol and diesel powered cars combined with favourable taxation/ treatment of electric cars, see Econ 
(2009), Rasmussen (2011) and Bjertnæs et al. (2011), have contributed to place Norway in the lead of 
the transition towards electric cars. This has made it possible to calibrate the model to this stock of 
electric cars, with current tax exemptions implemented.  
 
A baseline policy scenario is analysed where increased consumption of fuels contributes to increase 
emissions, while electric cars generate zero emissions. Computer simulations unveils that the welfare 
gain of increasing the tax rate on purchase of electric cars from 8 to 37 percent amounts to 
approximately 5500-6500 NOK per ton increase in GHG emissions when initial percentage tax rates 
are; 167 on petrol, 119 on diesel, 52 on electricity, 93 on petrol cars, 37 on plug-in hybrid cars, and 84 
on diesel cars. All tax rates are unchanged in all future periods, and lump-sum transfers are adjusted to 
satisfy the government budget constraint. This welfare gain amounts to almost 1 percent of current 
(2007) GDP, while the increase in the emission of GHG’s is less than 10 percent of current (2007) 
                                                     
2The number of electric cars per inhabitant in Norway is substantially larger than the number of electric car per inhabitant in 
any other country in the world. The market share of electric cars in Norway, however, only amounts to 2.8 percent while the 
market share in Western Europe equals 0.2 percent according to AID/ Industry Sources.  
6 
emissions3. The substantial tax wedge implies that reallocation from climate friendly cars towards 
petrol and diesel powered cars generates a tax revenue gain of more than 40 billion NOK each year in 
the long run, which amounts to almost 10 percent of government consumption in 2007. The welfare 
gain of increasing the tax rate on purchase of electric cars from 8 to 84 percent, amounts to 
approximately 4500-4800 NOK. The welfare gain per ton is somewhat more modest in this case as the 
reform lowers the distorting tax wedge between conventional and electric cars even more in this case. 
These welfare gains increases substantially when electric cars are assumed to run on electricity 
produced with the current emission intensive European mix. The social cost of carbon reported by the 
US Environmental Protection Agency range from 34 to 780 NOK per ton. Hence, welfare gains per 
ton increase in emissions by fare exceed the social cost of carbon.  
 
The study further discusses how results are affected when crude assumptions in the baseline scenario 
are altered. The baseline scenario excludes emissions connected to extraction and refining of fossil 
fuels as well as emissions connected to production of electricity and cars. This assumption is 
appropriate because these production sectors are included in the current European quota trading 
system, EU ETS. Unilateral emission reductions within these sectors would only generate equivalent 
increases in other sectors within the EU ETS. The Norwegian transport sector is not included in the 
EU ETS. Hence, unilateral policy directed towards this sector is not hampered by these leakage 
problems. Emissions connected to production of cars and energy should however be taken into 
consideration if the EU ETS is terminated. The increase in emissions generated by removing tax 
exemptions for electric cars is reduced (increased) if emissions originating from production of electric 
cars and electricity are higher (lower) than emissions originating from production of conventional cars 
and fuels. Hence, this contributes to increase (reduce) the welfare gain per ton increase in emissions. 
Emissions connected to production of electricity might be reduced by energy policy that stimulates 
production of cleaner energy. Such energy policy may however also be costly for the society.  
 
The study also conducts several sensitivity tests where uncertain parameter values are altered. Model 
simulatins show that changes in the substitution elasticity between cars and changes in the future stock 
of electric cars have a marginal effect on the result. Simulation results also show that the size of the 
initial tax wedge between electric and conventional cars is crucial for the result. The model framework 
is not designed to study short run impacts of changes in the taxation of electric cars. Relevant short run 
incentives like free public parking, which often includes charging free of charge, no road tax, access to 
                                                     
3 Changes in emissions from production of cars and fuels is not included  
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drive in the bus line, as well as relevant transport options like public transport and use of bicycle, is 
excluded from the model framework. Hence, short run impacts are byond the schope of this study.  
 
The background and policy scenarios are presented in section 2. The model is presented in section 3. 
Results and welfare effects are analysed in section 4 and 5, respectively. Section 6 concludes.  
2. Background and tax reforms  
Norway is competing with France and Germany to become the third largest electric car market in the 
world, behind U.S. and Japan. The number of electric cars sold per inhabitant in Norway by far 
exceeded the number of electric cars sold per inhabitant in any other country in the world in 2011, see 
Green car (2012). Table 2.1 presents tax rates on purchase of cars and fuels within the Norwegian tax 
system. These tax rates are calculated as a percentage of the producer price, and contain all indirect 
taxes levied on each of the goods including VAT. Note that the current tax levied on GHG emissions 
on fuels is incorporated into the tax rates on consumption of petrol and diesel. The tax on GHG 
emission was 0,8 NOK/litre petrol in 2007, while the average consumer price of 95 octane was 11,68 
NOK/ litre that year. This tax amounts to 345 NOK/ton GHG emission.  
Table 2.1. Present Norwegian tax rates  
  Hybrid Petrol Diesel Electricity  Hydrogen
Car purchase  37 93 84 8 8
Fuels   167 119 52 
Source: Statistics Norway: Energy account and National account  
 
The tax rate on buying and owning an electricity powered car only amounts to 8 percent, while the tax 
rate on buying and owning petrol and diesel powered cars amounts to 93 and 84 percent, respectively. 
The tax rate on consumption of electricity equals 52 percent. The tax rate on petrol and diesel equals 
167 and 119 percent, respectively. Favourable policy measures of electricity powered cars in the 
Norwegian economy includes: No tax on purchase, no VAT, reduced yearly tax, free public parking 
which often includes charging free of charge, no road tax, and access to drive in the bus line. Econ 
(2009) estimate that the value of the total subsidy wedge, including all policy incentives, in favour of 
electric cars relative to petrol and diesel powered cars in Norway amounts to 25-30.000 NOK/ ton 
2CO . The present analyses, however, only includes favourable taxation as other policy measures are 
assumed to be removed as the stock of electricity powered cars is expanding.  
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The favourable taxation of electric cars in Norway may to some extent be designed to assist an infant 
electric car industry and/ or to trigger technological development of electric cars4. The present study 
does not analyse the relevance of these arguments as the main aim of the present study is the long term 
effect of favourable taxation. The long run aspect, however, seem to be highly relevant as 
environmentalists argue in favour of preserving the present favourable taxation even though the stock 
of electric cars expands substantially. A reference scenario is employed as a benchmark to compare 
two policy reform scenarios where tax favours are removed. In the reference scenario it is assumed 
that all tax rates are set equal to the rates of the current Norwegian tax system in all future periods, see 
table 2.1. Producer prices are also kept constant in all future periods. The policy reform scenarios 
consist of changing the tax rates levied on purchase of climate friendly cars according to table 2.2.  
Table 2.2. Tax reforms 
  Hybrid Electric Hydrogen 
Reference 37 8 8 
Middle  37 37 37 
Uniform  84 84 84 
 
Tax rates on purchase of electric and hydrogen powered cars are increased from 8 to 37 percent in the 
middle tax scenario. This scenario removes some of the favourable taxation of climate friendly cars in 
the Norwegian tax system. In the uniform scenario tax rates on purchase of hydrogen and electric cars 
are increased from 8 to 84 percent, while the tax rate on purchase of plug-in hybrid cars is increased 
from 37 to 84 percent. This scenario removes the favourable taxation on purchase of all climate 
friendly cars in the Norwegian tax system, while the current taxation of energy is unchanged. All tax 
rates in each scenario are kept constant in all future periods.  
 
There are a range of external effects connected to automobiles that justifies taxation, see Parry et al. 
(2007a) and Econ (2003). One may speculate whether electricity powered cars will generate similar 
external effects as petrol and diesel powered cars. It is however hard to come up with good arguments 
why electricity powered cars should not generate the same external effects except for noise and 
emissions to air. Hence, other (external) effects like accidents, cueing, conspicuous consumption and 
free use of public roads is omitted from the analysis as a transition from electricity powered cars to 
petrol and diesel powered cars is assumed not to affect these types of externalities.  
                                                     
4 Note that all Norwegian electric car manufacturers is bankrupt as of 2012.  
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3. The model  
The decision to purchase a car constitutes a discrete choice where households and individuals choose 
between cars with a range of different attributes and prices. Households with heterogeneous 
preferences for attributes connected with cars which run on different types of fuel lead to differences 
in the willingness to pay for these cars. Falling aggregate demand functions can be constructed by 
sorting households according to willingness to pay. Such demand functions can be exploited to 
calculate the sum of consumer surplus across a number of consumers, see Varian (1999). These 
demand functions and consumer surpluses are analogous to demand functions and consumer surpluses 
which can be derived from a single consumer that maximizes utility. Hence, the choice of cars is 
constructed by assuming that a representative consumer with preferences for each type of car 
maximize utility with respect to purchase of each type of car and fuel, see Bjertnæs et al. (2011). The 
model contains five different types of cars which are powered by different types of fuels: Plug-in 
hybrid, petrol, diesel, electric and hydrogen cars. The different types of cars and fuels are incorporated 
into a nested CES (constant elasticity of substitution) -utility function. The representative consumer 
behaves as if prices including tax rates are exogenous. The consumer price of each consumer good 
equals a fixed producer price plus the tax rate levied on that good. The CES-utility function is 
illustrated in figure 3.1.  
 
The utility function consists of six levels. Level 1 consists of total private consumption, which 
includes total expenditures on private transport and all other consumer goods. Level 2 consists of 
private households total expenditures for private transport. This level includes other expenditures like 
maintenance and spare parts as well as expenditures for private transport. These two components 
constitute level 3. Level 4 consists of expenditures for each of the five types of cars. Expenditures for 
each type of car, level 5, consists of a service flow from that stock of cars, and expenditures on fuels 
for that type of car. Level 6 consists of different types of fuels used for plug-in hybrid cars. The CES-
utility function is chosen to be able to study different types of tax changes levied on purchase of 
different types of cars and fuels. The substitution elasticity between fuels employed for hybrid cars are 
zero to simplify the model. Assuming zero substitution between the service flow and use of fuel for 
each type of car implies that there are no tax distortions between buying and using a car in this model. 
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There is considerable uncertainty connected to the future elasticity of substitution between types of 
cars. Empirical studies are not likely to remove this uncertainty because the quality of future types of 
cars is unobservable today. The resent development in purchase of petrol and diesel powered cars 
however suggest that the substitution elasticity between types of cars is substantial. The substitution 
elasticity between operating expenditures for each pair of the different types of cars is assumed to 
increase to 8 in the long run in one scenario. Hence, differentiated tax rates generate substantial 
distortions in the allocation of types of cars in this model. A sensitivity test where the substitution 
elasticity among types of cars equals 3 is analysed to unveil whether results are sensitive to choice of 
substitution elasticity. The tax wedge between types of cars is determined by differences in tax rates 
levied on each type of car. This tax wedge consists of differences in tax rates on purchase of the car 
and on fuels. This modelling approach is justified by an empirical study which finds that consumers 
consider both prices on fuels and cars when they decide which type of car to buy, see Heldal et al. 
(2009). The substitution elasticity between other operating expenditures and total operating 
expenditures is assumed to be 0,4. The model does not incorporate substitution towards public 
transport and/ or walking and bicycling. Such substitution effects may alleviate substitution towards 
petrol and diesel cars as the tax on climate friendly cars are increased. The sensitivity test with lower 
substitution elasticity, however, unveils whether less substitution is important for the results derived. 
The current tax rates on purchase of petrol and diesel cars are calculated based on data from the 
National accounts. The tax rates on purchase of electric and hybrid cars are calculated by evaluating 
present tax rules and the quality of plug-in hybrid cars launched in 2011. The tax rates on fuels are 
calculated based on data from the energy accounts.  
 
The budget of the representative consumer consists of a fixed income minus a direct lump-sum tax/ 
transfer. This after tax income finances the consumption of all consumer goods in each period. The 
government is assumed to consume a fixed amount of consumer goods. This consumption is financed 
by indirect consumer taxes and a direct lump-sum tax/ transfer. The government budget constraint is 
satisfied each future period by adjusting the lump-sum tax/ transfer levied on the representative 
consumer when tax reforms are introduced. The budget constraint of the representative consumer 
together with the government budget constraint implies that the fixed income of the representative 
consumer equals total consumption measured in producer prices. This is consistent with an economy 
where all income earned by the production sector is transferred to the representative consumer. 
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4. Policy analysis 
4.1. The reference scenario  
The reference scenario is constructed by calibrating total private consumption, other consumer goods 
and total expenditures on private transport to aggregates from National account, 2005. Expenditure on 
private transport is decomposed into purchase of cars and fuels for each type of car. A smooth 
development in purchase of petrol and diesel cars is implemented to improve the dynamic aspect of 
the model5. The development in the stock of electric cars is implemented by assessing relevant 
statistics and studies containing information about the future development. Total expenditures on 
private transport is growing by 2,5 percent on average each year in the period 2001 to 2006. This 
growth rate is incorporated into total expenditures on transport in the reference scenario together with 
a zero rate of inflation. The fuel consumption of cars has gradually decreased in the past. Future 
decreases is incorporated by assuming a technological growth of 0,8 percent each year for all types of 
fuels. GHG emissions from fuels can also be reduced by mixing petrol and diesel with biofuels. This 
is, however, not incorporated into the model framework.  
 
The development in the stock of each type of car is determined by the development of the CES cost-
share of each type of car and the development of relative prices between cars, see appendix. The initial 
stock of each type of cars is determined by calibrating CES-cost-shares for each type of car. Expected 
technological improvements related to production and us of electric and hydrogen cars is implemented 
by gradually increasing CES cost-shares connected to these types of cars. CES-cost-shares of petrol 
and diesel cars are gradually decreased as the stock of electric and hydrogen cars is increasing, see 
appendix. A detailed description is given in Bjertnæs et al. (2011). Implementation of technological 
improvement by lowering the price of these cars does not generate a substantial stock of such cars 
within this model framework. Hence, the technological improvement is implemented by increasing 
CES cost-shares to be able to arrive at substantial stocks of electric, hybrid and hydrogen cars in the 
long run.  
 
There are approximately 10.000 electricity powered cars in Norway as of 2013. Electricity powered 
cars is however assumed to have a substantial market share in 2050 when the current favourable 
taxation is preserved. Note that the development of the stock of cars in the reference scenario is 
generated by the assumptions imposed in the reference scenario, see Bjertnæs et al. (2011) for a more 
                                                     
5 Modest deviations from National accounts are generated when dynamic aspects of the model are improved. Electric cars are 
not included as a separate good in Norwegian National Accounts.  
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detailed description of variables in the reference scenario. There are substantial uncertainties 
connected to these assumptions. This assumption seems to be consistent with pridictions in the 
literature even though the future market share of electric cars is highly uncertain. A study of 
Eurelectric (Eurelectric, 2007), an association representing the interests of the electricity industry in 
Europe, argue that plug-in hybrid vehicles can have a market share of 8 to 20 percent in 2030. ECN 
(2009) show that the share of light electric vehicles can reach 20 percent in 2030. Most individuals 
also seem to have a positive willingness to pay for cars that use alternative fuels, see Dagsvik and Liu 
(2009) and Caulfield et al. (2010). Devogelaer and Gusbin (2010), however, predict a smaller share of 
electric vehicles and plug-in hybrid vehicles in Belgium in the period 2012-2030. General climate 
policy measures generate a share of electric and plug-in hybrid vehicles of about 2% of the fleet in 
2020, and about 5% of the fleet in 2030 in their study. The stock of each type of car is displayed in 
figure 4.1. This figure shows that electric cars dominate the market in 2050. The stock of electric cars 
is more than twice as large as the stock of any other type of car in 2050. The stock of hybrid and 
hydrogen cars is marginal the first periods, but expands gradually and ends up with a modest market 
share in 2050.  
Figure 4.1. The stock of cars in the reference scenario, mill 2004-NOK 
 
4.2. The middle scenario 
Tax rates on purchase of electric and hydrogen powered cars are increased from 8 to 37 percent in the 
middle tax scenario. The increase in the price of electric and hydrogen cars leads to substitution away 
from electric and hydrogen cars. The magnitude of this effect is marginal in early periods when the 
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stock of electric and hydrogen cars is marginal. The effect of this reform is, however, substantial in the 
long run where electric cars constitute a substantial share of the market. Results of the reform are 
displayed in figure 4.2. Figure 4.2 shows that petrol and diesel powered cars are dominating the 
market in all periods. The stock of hybrid and electricity powered cars are marginal the first periods, 
but expands gradually and ends up with a substantial market share in 2050. The stock of electric cars 
is approximately half as large as the stock of petrol cars and 1/3 of the stock of diesel cars in 2050.  
 A comparison of figure 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate the substitution from electric cars towards petrol and 
diesel powered car. The stock of hydrogen cars is also reduced.  
Figure 4.2. The stock of cars in the middle scenario (37 % tax on climate friendly cars), mill 
2004-NOK 
 
4.3. The uniform tax scenario  
The tax rates on purchase of electricity and hydrogen powered cars are increased from 8 to 84 percent, 
while the tax rates on purchase of hybrid cars is increased from 37 to 84 percent in the uniform tax 
scenario6. The increase in the price of electric, hydrogen and hybrid cars leads to substitution away 
from these cars. Results of the reform are displayed in figure 4.3. This figure shows that electric, 
hydrogen and hybrid cars almost vanish from the market in the long run even though present taxes on 
fuels and electricity are unchanged. A comparison of figure 4.1 and 4.3 illustrate the substitution from 
electric, hybrid and hydrogen cars towards petrol and diesel powered car.  
                                                     
6 The tax rate on purchase of petrol powered cars remains constant at 93 percent in the uniform scenario.  
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Figure 4.3. The stock of cars in the uniform tax scenario, mill 2004-NOK 
 
4.4. Greenhouse gas emissions  
The GHG emissions are directly linked to the consumption of petrol and diesel, where one litre petrol 
generates 2,316 kg 2CO  and one litre diesel generates 2,663 kg 2CO . Emissions of 4CH  and ON 2  
is also incorporated and transformed into 2CO - equivalents. The consumption of petrol and diesel is 
linked to the stock of petrol, diesel and hybrid cars because there is no substitution between the 
services from the stock of cars and expenditures on fuels. Hence, an investigation of the development 
of these stocks of cars within each scenario explains the development in total emissions in each 
scenario. Total emissions of GHG’s amounts to approximately 6,7 mill ton 2CO equivalents in 2005. 
The model does not incorporate bio-fuels, and hence, tend to exaggerate the level of emission. The 
model also seems to predict a faster growth in GHG emission from household transport compared to 
the development the last twenty years. This development is however governed by drastic changes in 
the composition of petrol and diesel cars as well as technological progress.  
 
The reference scenario displays a modest growth in GHG emissions in early decades which translates 
into a modest drop towards 2050. There is steady growth in GHG emissions in the middle scenario. 
The main explanation is the steady growth in income spent on private transport. The increase in 
emissions generated by implementing the middle scenario is modest in early decades and substantial in 
the long run. The reason is that a large number of electric cars are replaced with petrol and diesel 
powered cars in the long run, while this replacement is modest in early decades. The increase in 
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emissions amounts to approximately 5 million ton 2CO -equivalents in 2050 when the substitution 
elasticity between types of cars equals 8. The increase in emission amounts to approximately 2,3 
million ton when the substitution elasticity between types of cars equals 3. The uniform scenario 
displays an even larger growth in emissions. The reason is that almost every climate friendly car is 
replaced with petrol and diesel powered cars in this scenario. The increase in emissions amounts to 
approximately 8,8 million ton 2CO -equivalents in 2050 when the substitution elasticity between types 
of cars equals 8. The increase in emission amounts to approximately 5,6 million ton when the 
substitution elasticity between types of cars equals 3.  
4.5. Tax revenue 
Total tax revenue generated is found by adding tax revenues generated by purchase of different cars 
and fuels. Purchase of cars is linked to the stock of cars in the long run due to a steady growth in 
stocks of cars. Purchase of fuels is also linked to the stock of cars as explained above. Hence, tax rates 
and the development in the different stocks of cars are sufficient to explain the development in total 
tax revenue generated.  
 
Tax revenue generated by taxation of energy and cars which exceeds revenue generated in the 
“reference scenario” is transferred lump-sum to the representative consumer. The lump-sum transfers 
are marginal in the short run and substantial in the long run in both the middle scenario and the 
uniform scenario. The reason is that a substantial stock of climate friendly car is replaced with petrol 
and diesel powered cars in the long run in these two scenarios compared with the “reference scenario”. 
Tax rates on petrol and diesel by far exceed the tax rates on electricity and hydrogen. The tax rate on 
purchase of petrol cars exceeds the tax rate on other cars in both these scenarios. Hence, this 
reallocation generates more tax revenue. The increase in total tax revenues in 2050 amounts to more 
than 40 billion NOK in both the middle and the uniform scenario when the substitution elasticity 
between types of cars equals 8. This gain of tax revenue amounts to approximately 8600 NOK per ton 
increase in GHG emissions when the middle scenario is introduced. Tax revenue generated and 
transferred lump-sum is even larger when the substitution elasticity between types of cars equals 3.  
5. Welfare effects  
The study analyses welfare effects of the entire transition to the new composition of cars. The welfare 
gain per ton increase in emissions is found by calculating the change in present value welfare divided by 
the change in accumulated emissions, where emissions in future periods are weighted with the discount 
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rate. The present value of welfare is found by discounting the top aggregate in the CES-utillity function, 
total private consumption, with a five percent interest rate and summing over all future periods. Table 5.1 
reports presentvalue welfare gains per ton increase in emissions as well as yearly effects from 2030 and 
2050, measured in fixed 2005 prices. The welfare gain generated by implementing the “middle scenario” 
amounts to approximately 5500-6500 NOK per ton increase in GHG emissions. The welfare gain of 
implementing the “uniform scenario”, where the tax on purchase of electric cars is increased to the 
average tax rate of diesel powered cars, amounts to approximately 4500-4800 NOK per ton increase in 
emissions, see table 5.1. The welfare gain per ton is somewhat more modest in this case as the reform 
lowers the distorting tax wedge between conventional and electric cars even more in this case. These 
substantial long run changes in welfare and tax revenues are generated by changes in the stock of petrol/ 
diesel cars and electric cars due to each of the policy reforms. The qualitative impact of these reforms is 
similar even though the quantitative impacts differ. The qualitative impact of the “middle scenario” is 
presented below while the impact of the “uniform scenario” is omitted.  
Table 5.1. Welfare gain per ton increase in GHG emissions, NOK/ ton  
  
Middle 
scenario, low 
elasticity
Middle 
scenario, high 
elasticity
Uniform 
scenario, low 
elasticity 
Uniform 
scenario, high 
elasticity
2030 6587 5688  5577 5336
2050 7184 5983  5785 5196
Present value/ Accumulated emissions1 6455 5575  4798 4579
1 Accumulated emissions equal the sum of emissions in all future periods, where emissions in future periods are weighted 
with the discount rate. 
 
Implementation of the “middle scenario” implies that the tax rate on purchase of electric cars is 
increased from 8 to 37 percent. This leads to substitution from electric cars towards petrol and diesel 
powered cars. The tax rates on purchase of petrol and diesel powered cars is more than twice as large 
as the tax rate on electric cars. Hence, this substitution contributes to increase welfare as resources are 
allocated from low taxed goods to high taxed goods. The “middle scenario” also leads to decreased 
consumption of electricity and increased consumption of petrol and diesel as the stocks of cars 
changes. This reallocation of energy consumption contributes to increase the welfare gain as the tax 
rates on petrol and diesel by fare exceeds the tax rate on electricity. Hence, the major welfare gain of 
increasing the tax rate on electric cars is generated by the reallocation from electric to petrol/ diesel 
powered cars together with substantial tax exemptions for purchase of electric cars and heavyer 
taxation of petrol and diesel compared with consumption of electricity.  
 
The simulations also unveiled a substantial gain of tax revenue generated when the “middle scenario” 
is introduced. The government budget is balanced by transferring these additional tax revenues lump-
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sum to the representative consumer in the reference scenario. Additional welfare gains could be 
achieved by recycling tax revenues by cutting other distorting taxes. Welfare gains connected to a 
more even distribution of income could be achieved by transferring money to poor households. These 
arguments suggest that the method used underestimates the difference in welfare between the 
reference scenario and the “middle scenario”. This could be corrected for by multiplying the gain of 
revenue (8600 NOK/ ton increase of GHG emissions in 2050) by the marginal cost of public funds 
(MCF) minus one. Hence, the additional welfare gain per ton GHG emissions amounts to 2150 NOK 
when MCF equals 1.25.  
 
Yearly welfare gains per ton increase in GHG emissions are reported to test whether results are 
sensitive to changes in the stock of electric cars. Yearly welfare gains in 2050 are roughly the same as 
yearly welfare gains reported in 2030 even though stocks of cars are very different. Hence, results are 
not sensitive to assumptions that generate different levels of stocks of cars. A lower substitution 
elasticity between types of cars contribute to reduce the reallocation from electric to conventional cars. 
This contributes to lower both the welfare gains and the increase in GHG emissions when reforms are 
introduced. Simulations show that the difference in results with high and low substitution elasticity is 
modest. It is however hard to explain what generates the difference.  
 
Electric cars require clean electricity to remain a low emission vehicle even though electric cars are more 
energy efficient, see Thiel et al. (2010) and Econ (2008). Close to 100 percent of the Norwegian 
production of electricity consists of clean hydro power. The Norwegian electricity grid is however 
connected with the European electricity grid, where electricity is produced with a mix of polluting and 
non-polluting power plants. Emission reductions connected to a transition to electric cars become more 
modest when the source of electricity consists of this European mix, and the EU ETS is abolished. 
Hawkins et al. (2012) employ a life cycle approach which include production of cars and fuels and find 
that electric vehicle powered by the present European mix generates a 10 to 30 percent decrease in global 
warming potential compared to conventional diesel and gasoline vehicles when vehicle lifetime exceeds 
150.000 km7. Hence, welfare gains per ton increase in GHG emissions attached to each reform analysed 
in this study will increase as the increase in emissions is reduced. Implementing results from Hawkins et 
al. (2012) generates a welfare gain between 18.000 and 65.000 NOK per ton increase in GHG emissions 
due to an increase in the tax rate on purchase of electric cars from 8 to 37 percent. The welfare gain of 
implementing the “uniform” scenario with this European mix amounts to 15.000 to 48.000 NOK per ton. 
                                                     
7 The upper estimate is more relevant for petrol powered cars while the lower estimate is more relevant for diesel powered 
cars.  
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6. Conclusion 
This study shows that the welfare gain, excluding environmental effects, generated by increasing the 
tax rate on purchase of electric cars from 8 to 37 percent amounts to approximately 5500-6500 NOK 
per ton increase in GHG emissions in the long run when electric cars run on electricity that do not 
generate emission of GHG’s. Substantial tax exemptions also implies that reallocation from electric 
cars towards petrol and diesel powered cars generates a tax revenue gain of more than 40 billion NOK 
per year in the long run. The welfare gain per ton increase in emissions amounts to approximately 
4500-4800 NOK when the tax on purchase of electric cars are increased to the average tax rate of 
diesel powered cars. The main explanation for these substantial welfare effects is that electric cars are 
exempted from revenue rising taxes as well as taxes justified by local external effects like accidents 
and cueing, while purchase of conventional cars and fuel is heavily taxed. These welfare gains 
increases substantially when electric cars are assumed to run on electricity produced with the current 
emission intensive European mix.  
 
A number of relevant factors are omitted. First, reallocations of cars from electric to petrol/ diesel 
powered cars are likely to increase emissions of NOx and some other gasses. This reallocation is also 
likely to increase negative external effects connected to noise. These effects are not incorporated into 
the welfare measure. Hence, the welfare gain of increasing the tax rate on purchase of electric cars is 
likely to be overestimated when such effects are excluded. Second, the transition from electric cars 
towards petrol and diesel cars would generate a more modest increase in GHG emissions when some 
of the fossil fuel is replaced with biofuel. It is however also more expensive to manufacture some 
forms of biofuels compared to fossil fuels. Hence, the net welfare impact is ambiguous. Third, 
consumption of petrol and diesel in Norway may generate a reduction in consumption of petrol and 
diesel in other countries due to a world market with an increasing supply curve. This effect would 
reduce the increase in emissions connected to a transition to petrol and diesel powered cars in Norway. 
The welfare gain per ton increase in emissions consequently increases. Fourth, substitution away from 
electric cars may prevent technological development connected to electric cars which constitutes 
positive external effects. The Norwegian market for cars is however small compared to the rest of the 
world. Hence, it is not likely that Norwegian policy influence R&D decisions of large multinational 
cars manufacturers. Fifth, the future design and existence of an international quota market for GHG 
emissions may reduce the relevance of results derived in this study. Sixth, the future stock of electric 
and hybrid cars are highly uncertain. A radical change in technology in favour of one type of car may 
also reduce the relevance of this study. 
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Appendix A 
Operating expenditures of electric cars is given by 
 
(1A) expel = omel *( ( pcel / pcall ) ** (1-sigall) ) *expall.  
 
Equation (1A) shows that operating expenditures of electric cars, expel, equals the CES-cost-share of 
electric cars, omel, multiplied by an expression which includes the price of operating expenditures of 
electric cars, pcel, divided by the price aggeregate of operating expenditures of all cars, pcall. The 
impact of a relative price change is determined by the substitution elasticity between types of cars, 
sigall. This expression is multiplied with operating expenditures for all cars, expall. Note that 
operating expenditures of electric cars equals the CES-cost-share of electric cars multiplied with 
operating expenditures of all cars when pcel/pcall equals unity.  
 
CES-cost-share of types of cars in all periods  
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